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PREFACE

Large macro imbalances, policy distortions, and weakening
of the institutions have emerged as major development
constraint to achieving and sustaining a high rate of growth.
. Pakistani government has negotiated more than a dozen
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes with the
international financial institutions since 1980. The high growth
momentum· achieved during the 1980s faltered during the
current decade. The drastic slow-downin the economic activity
and the persistence of large current account and fiscal deficit
have resulted in a substantial increase in the incidence of
poverty as well as the inability to meet the external debt
servicingobligation.
lshrat Husain addresses the issue of what went wrong
with the reform programme of the Government of Pakistan. He
draws upon his rich experience of the implementation of
adjustment programmes in many countries and proposes
certain yardsticks to assess the nature of critical reform
ingredients, the timing and sequencing of the reform
components, and their timely implementation. From the
political economy perspective he argues that reforms are not
always carried through logicallyand, consequently, the reform
process gets stalled due to opposing political interests if the
losers outvote and outvoice the prospective winners on account
of different reforms. The domestic ownership of the adjustment
programme and the existence of Implementation capacity are
the two critical pre-conditions for success in the implementation of a reform agenda.
.<iii)
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Ishrat Husain explains the reform impasse in Pakistan in
terms of weak ownership and limited implementation capacity
within the government. The policy-makers in Pakistan would
benefit from the timely and pertinent contribution made by Dr
Husain.
Sarfraz Khan Qureshi
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INTRODUCTION

The broad literature on structural adjustment and
economic policy reforms often falls into the habit of making
wholesale judgements of the sort: "adjustment does or does
not work because ... " And, not surprisingly, the vast majority of
this writing tends to view adjustment negatively. Not only are
we thus subjected to holistic assessments of structural
adjustment, we are also subjected to universalistic explanations. · These criticisms encompass the whole spectrum of
ideological predilections ranging from the left, which considers
neo-liberal policies underpinning these reforms as pure
anathema, to the libertarians, who consider any form of
government intervention as repugnant to individual freedom.
In addition. there are non-ideological critics too. Ayittey
(1994), for example, denounces the World Bank for its support
of adjustment programmes which he claims do not · take
account of political and social realities in Africa, and embody a
host of other evils.
These wholesale views both of the relative success or
failure of adjustment policies and of its causes are definitively
challenged by a number of empirical studies. These studies
demonstrate (1) that there is considerable variation in the
economic results of adjustment programmes, and (2) that
this variation is explicable in terms of the content, quality and
sustained application of adjustment policies.
Author's Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its management or the staff.
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The key questions which arise, therefore, are: If these
policy reforms are associated with such high pay-offs, then
why are these reform programmes not sustained and implemented consistently? Why are they derailed? Why is the record
so poor in the case of Pakistan?
The determinants of sustainability of economic reforms
cover a wide range of variables-initial conditions specific to
each country; design, content and sequencing of reforms;
ownership and political commitment, particularly from a
strong, visionary leadership; administrative and implementation capacity; the conditionalities of international financial
institutions and external donors; and unanticipated external
shocks.
In studying the case of Pakistan there are added
complications as the country moved from military rule to a
democratically elected regime during the period of economic
reforms. In the initial years-1988 to 1990-there was an
uneasy fear of the re-emergence of military rule and hence the
first democratically elected government was constricted by the
various compromises it had to make in order to keep the Army
off its back. Political survival was the key preoccupation. The
subsequent elected governments had to live in the shadow of
the constitutional provision introduced by the Zia regime
empowering the indirectly elected president to dismiss the
parliaments and the elected prime ministers. Invoking this
provision, before they could complete their tenures, three
elected governments were dismissed between 1990 and 1996.
Since 1988 Pakistan has had four elected governments and
four caretaker governments.
The second and the third elected governments did not
have clear majority and had to form coalitions and alliances
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with disparate groups which had nothing in common except
the motivation to remain in power. The survival instincts.
therefore, overwhelmed the urge to make tough political
decisions on the economic front. The element of political
uncertainty and instability, exacerbated by the threats of floorcrossing by small splinter groups, the Sword of Democles of
the presidential power to dismiss the government, and
different political parties holding offices at the centre and the
provinces did not create conditions conducive to strong
political will or resolve to deal with key structural reforms in
the country.
Under such circumstances, it becomes extremely difficult
to disentangle the strength and magnitude of each of the
variables at work. A more tractable approach is to group these
variables together and analyse the contribution of each group
separately, assuming that the appropriate functional form of
relationships is additive and the interactive terms are at best
weak or insignificant. The question of design, content and
sequencing of reforms, and the specific initial conditions have
been analysed in a number of earlier studies in Pakistan and
by the World Bank and the IMFand is, therefore, not the focus
of the present inquiry. This paper focuses on the political
economy aspects of sustainability of economic reforms by
introducing three basic hypotheses, and
testing
these
hypotheses with the evidencefrom Pakistan.
The political economy of adjustment has become a
burgeoning area of interest in the literature drawing on the
inter-disciplinary tools of analysis and cross-country
comparative perspectives. Several useful insights have been
gained through this body of research. {See, Nelson (1990);
Haggard and Kaufman (1992); Thomas and Grindle (1991);
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Callaghy and Ravenhill ( 1993); Bates and Krueger ( 1993);
Husain (1994) and Webb and Haggard (1994).J This literature

can. be roughly classified within three broad categories or
approaches to the sort of questions we have posed.
The first of these focuses on external causes of economic
stagnation. Although not inherently a topic of singular
interest to the political left. the analysis of external causes
sometimes appears to have become the monopoly industry of
neo-Marxist thinkers. Despite variation in emphasis and
approach, writers such as Andre Gundar Frank, Paul Baran,
Walter Rodney, and Samir Amin all began from the
unquestioned assumption that Third World underdevelopment stemmed from the prolongation of imperialist
domination, via metropolitary power to manipulate markets
and capital flows, into the post-colonial era [Ruccio and
Simon (1992)). While the end of the Cold War, coupled with
the highly visible success of the East Asian economies, has
cooled the ardour of dependency theorists, a variant of this
line of reasoning lives on in a "Third Worldist" critique of the
International Financial Institutions.
As a large number of critics have pointed out, the trouble

with theories that place entire causal weight on external
factors is that they neglect the dynamics within developing
countries that might account in a very large measure for their
growth or stagnation. Thus, a number of analysts have focused
attention on the state and its political motives in guiding
national economies toward growth or decline [Skoupl et al.
(1986)).

Yet another major approach in political economy that
relates to domestic causes of policy change stems from the
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pioneering work of Mancur Olson [Olson (1962)). This vein of
thought focuses attention on the power and motives of social
collectivitiesor interest groups in influencing the state in ways
that may impede economic growth. Writing in this tradition,
Haggard and Kaufman ( 1992) posit that economic policy
change is plagued by numerous collective action problems.
Stable prices can be viewed as a public good, but individuals
and firms can gain from policies that undermine stability and
might be reluctant to bear the costs of stabilisation if others do
not do so as well. Similarly, trade liberalisation or state
enterprise reforms can generate overall efficiency gains, but
individual firms or sectors will lobby to retain particularistic
benefits. This literature is less clear on the how's and the
process of managing the transition from a state of undesirable
and distorted economy to a desirable and sustainable path.
The uncertainties about the likely impact of various policy
actions, and the gaps in information and knowledge about the
responses of the diverse groups of economic actors under
varying political regimes, make this an extremely difficulttask.
THREEHYPOTHESES
We draw on all these schools of thought in formulating
the following three hypotheses about the sustainability or
otherwise of economic reforms and test these hypotheses by
using the evidence from Pakistan.
Hypothesis 1: Variation depends on a set of initial

conditions which precipitate the decision to undertake adjustment programmes. These conditions can be systematically
identified in the realms of economics, local politics, and the
approach of international donors:
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The above conditions can be grouped in three categories:
(i) Whether economicconditions are desperate or not. When

economic conditions have reached a complete collapse,
then countries consider that the benefits from
adjustment policies are likely to exceed the costs
compared to the existing or other alternative strategies.
The genuine commitment to initiate reforms in such
conditions is expected to be stronger there than in
countries where the economic decline is not
perceptible.
(ii) Whether economic interests are · strongly or weakly
organised, and whether they have previously
established a degree of leverage over the state in its
power to distribute appropriable rents. Where economic

interest groups of a rent-seeking character have such
power over the state. then adjustment programmes
may be implemented superficially, based on negotiations of the sort that Callaghy and Ravenhill ( 1993) has
referred to as the "ritual dance" of African finance
ministers before the International Financial Institutions (IFis)-but which is not coupled with real
commitment to overriding local interests.
(iii) Whether leadership is committed to reform. The quality
and devotion of leadership to reform is an overlooked
variable. and cannot be reduced to the nostrum
"political will". It may prove to be critical whether
leaders fully understand the need for adjustment. and
whether they feel ownership.
Hypothesis 2: Variation depends on the country's sense of

"ownership" of the reform process. which may be defined to
include two basic elements: ( 1) Consensus among the social
and political organisations that constitute national civil
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societies; and (2) the presence of a technocratic core group in
government that is truly devoted to the reform process.
"Ownership" is presented as a hypothesis separate from
that of initial conditions, because it may be possible to develop
ownership after the initiation of reforms. Oftentimes, this takes
place at the initiative of governments, who hold public
discussions and debates involving trade unions, opposition
political forces, community organisations, businesses, and so
on.
3: Variation depends on the presence of
"capacity" in a given country. Capacity is defined as human
capital and the resilience of institutions.
The East Asian
economic miracle shows the utter necessity of having in place
the individuals
capable
of identifying,
planning
and
implementing policy. This implies also strong civil service
institutions,
and norms and regulations
which prevent
political interference in the work of policy units.
Hypothesis

We examine below the evidence in case of Pakistan to test
each of the three hypotheses:
(a) Why did Pakistan decide to undertake adjustment
programmes? (b) How broad-based was the ownership of these
programs?
and (c) How effective was the capacity to
implement?

WHY DID PAKISTAN DECIDE TO INITIATE
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES?
The decision to initiate these programmes is reachedthough not always consciously or deliberately-when
the costs
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of continuing with existing policies exceed the net benefits that
can be realised by pursuing adjustment programmes. One of
the main elements in this calculus is the expectation of
external resource availabilityfrom the IFls and donors and the
prospects of debt rescheduling in future. The net benefits can
be conceived to consist of two components-first, the expected
external resource availability including debt relief, and,
second, the likely improvement in the domestic economic
performance such as increased domestic savings, rise in export
earnings. investment and output growth etc. Although the
separation may not always be that sharp, this analytical
distinction provides a useful way to examine the questions of
ownership and commitment.
In countries where the decision to embark upon the
programme is driven primarily by the considerations of the
first component of the benefit stream, the implementation
remains highly fragile, adversarial, and conditionality-ridden.
There are two variants of this trend. First, there is a bargaining
game in which the recipient country tries to extract maximum
amount of resources with as little change in policies as it can
get way with. and the IFis and the donors placing as many
conditionalities as possible and 'tranchmg' their releases of
funds on pre-specified actions in policy changes. The second
variant is that the !Fis themselves take the initiative, on the
basis of their own analysis, to persuade and convince the
countries about the need to undertake reforms.
Where the driving force is a genuine desire to bring about
some improvement in the domestic economic performance, i.e..
the second component of the benefit stream. the chances for
sustained progress are bright. The ownership and commitment
in this case are high, while the main tactic under the former
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case is to substitute adjustment by external resource inflows
and delay taking tough decisions which may have negative
political repercussions.
The first ingredient of the first hypothesis is the willing-

ness to initiate comprehensiveand radical reforms and is more
likely to surface in countries where the economic system has
failed or collapsed and the conditions are desperate. Pre-emptive
reforms designed to ward off the disastrous effects of
unsustainable fiscal deficits or to raise mediocre rates of growth
will encounter greater resistance. The semblance of an orderly
and apparently functioning economic system, but ridden deep
down with serious distortions, may lull the craving for reforms.
The main motivation for entering into adjustment
programmes in case of Pakistan has consistently been the
short term foreign liquidity infusion by IFis and other donors
and not the desire for longer term structural change. Economic
conditions have never been desperate or the crisis has not
assumed such an alarming proportion that the rulers had to
take strong corrective measures such as were necessitated in
Mexico, Indonesia, etc., in 1994 and 1997 respectively.

.

In the 1970s, when Pakistan was shaken up by the
separation of East Pakistan, oil price shocks, and the nationalisation policies of ZA Bhutto's Government, the current
account deficit had reached about 10 percent of GDP. The
generous assistance from the OPECmember countries and the
home remittances from the migrant workers in the Middle East
came to the rescue of the country avoidinga hard landing.
In 1993 when the Nawaz Sharif Government was
dismissed the external reserves had dipped to $300-400
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million · level, the interim Government of Moeen Qureshi
negotiated a deal with the IMF and a shot in the arm was
provided. The Benazir Bhutto Government had led the country
in 1996 to the same precipitous situation but the caretaker
government, by various kinds of borrowings arid deposits of
the friendly countries, was able to service the external debt on
time. It must be said to the credit of both the Moeen Qureshi
Government and the care taker Government of 1996 that they
had initiated some strong reforms but these could not be
sustained by the subsequent incoming elected governments.
The most severe crisis occurred in the aftermath of
nuclear bomb testing on May 28, 1998. The seven month
period upto the approval of the 'IMF programme in January
1999 was a period of real trial and tribulations and the
closest the country came to the brink of default. A freeze on
the foreign currency accounts, postponement of all external
payments except to preferred creditors, inflows of deposits
from a few friendly countries, forced decline in imports an?
fall in world prices of oil and other commodities, roll over of
swap funds and accumulation of the arrears enabled the
country to avoid the default but also caused a grievous shock
to the credibility of the economic policies. It will take quite
some time of consistent good management
that private
investment will revive. Availability of adequate food supplies
in the country and low prices of imported commodities did
save the country from inflationary pressures arising from a
free fall in the value of the currency and · the attendant
volatility. The life of the ordinary citizen was not so harshly
affected. Most of the hue and cry came from the elite this
time who had converted their rupees into dollars and the
freezing of these accounts hit them hard. But as this class
gets hardly any empathy from the general masses the social

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/20

11

consequences of the economic chaos remained limited and
the prophets of doom and gloom were proved wrong.
Thus, unlike many adjusting countries mainly in Africa,
East Asia or Latin America. Pakistan did not cross the
minimum threshold of generalised suffering and misery over
an extended period of time. Neither did the economic
indicators such as economic growth, inflation, shortages of
essential food items, insolvency of the banks etc. take a deep
and sharp plunge. The absence of these perceptibly desperate
conditions did not force Pakistan to adopt tough adjustment
measures. Only limited actions were taken to win the approval
of the IFis and the external donors. But the discussion at the
IMF and the World Bank Boards in January 1999 has revealed
that this approach of soft options is no longer going to work in
the future. Why? It cannot be that the IFls are disappointed
by the survival charactertsttcs of the Pakistan's economy. Or
is it that the Boards feel they have been taken for a ride!
The second ingredient associated with the launching of

adjustment programmes is the relative strength or weakness of
the dominant interest groups in the country. A study of
political economy of reforms has aptly summarised; "Policy
reforms have redistrtbutive consequences for different groups
which organise to protect their incomes and rents. Politicians
respond to the constituent pressures because they seek to
remain in office and they exchange policy distortions for
political support. The fate of any reform effort thus hinges on
the political balance of power between the winners and losers
in the reform effort".
The distribution of the pains of adjustment is always
highly skewed. The rent-seeking and privileged classes had
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already accumulated
sufficient wealth, taking advantage of
policy distortions in the period before adjustment and, thus,
freeing themselves from the pains involved. But the rest of the
society suffers in the immediate aftermath of adjustment
programmes as food subsidies are eliminated. imported goods
become expensive, real wages decline. and public sector
employment is either frozen or cut down. Political leaders,
whether elected or authoritarian,
are hardly able to fathom
this situation.
This time inconsistency
issue has been
analysed in understanding the behaviour of economic agents
and is equally applicable to political actors. Unless a new

domestic constituency in support of the reforms emerges, the
pressures from the rent-seeking and privileged elites, who are
losers in the long run, would remain intense. But there is
insufficient understanding as to how new coalitions of the
potential beneficiaries of the reforms-small traders and
entrepreneurs, informal sector and rural population-may be
built.
The absence of a large scale and deep crisis in Pakistan
was accompanied by the presence of strong vested interests
organised around the ruling classes. The proposed structural
adjustment reforms would have reduced the opportunities for
rent-seeking and discretionary favours, brought those evading
taxes under the tax net, forced the defaulters of loans to
liquidate their assets to repay and stop the theft of power and
gas. Import liberalisation and tariff reduction would have hurt
the highly protected industrial enterprises. Value-added tax
and documentation of the economy would reduce the economic
returns of the traders and professional classes. Agricultural
income tax and increase in irrigation water charges would
diminish the unearned incomes of the landed gentry.
Privatisation of state owned enterprises and reform of
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administrative system would threaten the powers of the civil
servants and the managers of the enterprises along with the
organised union leaders. Reform of financial sector would no
longer allow the political leaders to dispense loans to their
favourites and supporters. The delivery of social services by
the NGOs, private sector or regulated by communities would
no longer enable creation of employment opportunities which
can be traded by the MPAsand MNAs.
It is obvious that every single economic reform, if
implemented credibly,. would turn the. tide against th.e vested
interests of the elite class. And as these classes are responsible
for the design and implementation of the reforms, no wonder
the track record of implementation has remained so poor for
such a long period.
This leads to the third ingredient under the first
hypothesis, i.e., the quality and commitment of top political
leadership. The reason for the domination of the vested
interest group of actors arises primarily from the lack of
commitment to long-termdevelopment and the absence of a
clear vision by the top political leadership of the direction in
which the country should be moving. If there was such a
long-term framework and vision of the future, it would
become clear that economic reforms are only one of the
several elements necessary to attain the long term development goals. Leaders who are too preoccupied with fighting
day-to-day crises and have limited mental horizons consider
economic reforms-quite understandably-as
irritants and
external impositions without realising their links with longterm development. For them, the political costs of these
reforms are paid upfront when they have the responsibility,
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while it is not obvious if they would be in power at the time
when benefits start accruing. A leader with vision of history
rather than a politician unable to lift his sights beyond the
next elections is more likely to provide the support and
commitment to reforms.
The entanglement of successive political leadership with
the elite class coupled with the fragility of the political system
that was being re-established in the post Zia period do not
make it very easy to tease out the commitment of political
leadership to these reforms from other intervening variables.
Both Benazir Bhutto as well as Nawaz Sharif were quite
supportive of economic reforms in their public pronouncements and their policies, on paper. did not look much
different. The actions taken by Benazir Government in
attracting foreign investors to the power generation sector and
by the present Government to set WAPDAon the right track do
speak in favour of the commitment to reforms but such
examples are few and far between.
A longer view of the situation does however show that the
commitment has been uneven at best in terms of results. Each
successive government has started with a programme of
privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, budgetary deficit
reduction, export promotion, financial sector restructuring
but the results and outcomes have been disappointing. All big
loss makers among the public enterprises such as WAPDA,
Steel Mill etc. continue to weaken public sector finances.
Import tariffs are still high although they are lower than the
past levels. Worse, the discretionary powers of issuing the
SROs have been flagrantly misused. The formal and informal
stranglehold of the state apparatus on private business
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decisions remains unscathed creating unpredictability in the
rules of the game. Multiple taxes, charges, cesses, levies at
various
levels of the government
have added to the
extortlonary powers of the state functionaries. Attempts at
deficit reduction have been made without initiating the
underlying changes in the revenue and tax system and at the
expense of reduced development expenditure. Export base
remains narrow and growth seems to have tapered off in recent
years. The major nationalised banks and DFis still dominate
the financial markets.
The above outcomes do attest to the lack of both
commitment and credibility of the political leadership of all
persuasions over an extended period of time. The pressures of
keeping coalition partners happy to retain power may have
softened the resolve in the past but the large mandate given to
the present government,
the elimination
of the Eighth
amendment to the constitution and the withdrawal of the army
chief from effective decision-making
role do provide an
excellent opportunity for bringing about genuine structural
reforms in the country.

HOW BROAD-BASED WAS THE OWNERSHIP
OF THESE PROGRAMMES?

The earlier World Bank studies of adjustment lending
have concluded that the chances of success are higher if there
is ownership of the programme by the country. These findings
also corroborate Kahler's (1992) earlier work which showed
that prior commitment and policy action (taken before external
support is offered) are a good predictor of successful
implementation. Successful influence is more likely if
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governments commit themselves to an adjustment programme
and only then are supported financially by the IFis.
The meaning and definition of ownership have, however,
remained fuzzy, despite the World Bank's OED's (Operations
Evaluation Department's) attempt to elaborate on the definition
of ownership and its application to the World Bank's own
lending experience for adjustment in Africa. There are several
other practical problems. First, · what is the appropriate time
path for strengthening the ownership? If the reforms produce
fairly early pay-offs, does this help strengthen the ownership or
slow the pace? Neither theory nor evidence provide any
guidance to answer these questions. Second, the stability of the
government itself is equally critical. If the governments keep
changing rapidly, it is difficult to establish ownership. A third
problem is that the economic generosity of the donors, in so far
as it results in a soft budget constraint or allows the
governments to postpone taking tough decisions, may also slow
down the progress towards owner-ship. Finally, at the
intellectual level, there are still remnants of ideological
resistance to "market friendly"paradigm of development which
underpins the adjustment policies. The neo Marxian,
"dependency" school of thought, anti-colonialists and others,
who genuinely believe that the "markets" are anti-social, create
inequities, hurt the poor and are repressive, still command
considerable influence particularly among the non-economists.
There are well-meaning scholars who fear that integration in the
world economy is beset with disastrous consequences as poor
developingcountries cannot compete with the rest of the world.
The extraordinary and more visible influence,. or in
popular jargon. the "imposition" of the World Bank and the
IFis in the conceptualisation and design of the policy changes,
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has also affronted a number of serious scholars and policy
makers and, in some cases, strengthened opposition to
otherwise sensible economic policy· changes. Many academics,
practitioners and private sector groups may broadly concur
with the basic policy thrust of these programmes, but they find
it annoying that their advice and analyses on the same lines
are ignored by their own governments, while the same
governments followthe !Fis without any questioning. This group
of potentially natural allies for ownership of economic reforms
has either distanced itself or joined the opposition. This
nationalist sentiment can. in fact. be harnessed to enhance the
ownership of the programmes rather than leading to alienation.
"Ownership" should not be construed in a very narrow
sense, i.e.. of the government in power, or, more specifically,
the economic team of the government consisting usually of the
Finance Minister, Governor of the Central Bank, Secretary
Finance and their staff. Ownership should be much more
broad-based, with a shared vision and a sense of direction in
which the economy is to move. In the absence of clarity of
goals and objectives, agreement on the time path required for
achieving these . goals and the open discussion and debate
about the various trade offs required to achieve these goals, it
would be difficult to mobilise support from other socioeconomic forces in the country such as private businesses,
professionals, political parties, NGOs, students and labour
unions. The assumption that external approval from donors or
IFls will persuade or generate a commitment to economic
reform is unlikely to prove valid.
Open discussions and debates, communication and
interaction among diverse parties and groups are the only
feasible ways to enhance the acceptability _of the programmes.
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Trade Union leaders in particular have often made the point
that, if they were duly consulted, explained the rationale and
justification for various policy measures, and informed about
the likely consequences and objectives, they would be in a
better position to make a healthy and constructive contribution to both the diagnosis and the required prescription.
It is also conceivable that ownership and commitment
could be associated with some select elements of adjustment
programmes, while other elements of the programmes that are
not perceived to have popular support may lack ownership.
The implementation capacity may therefore vary under those
circumstances, with the non-controversial elements of the
package moving forward rapidly while others being pulled
back.
Academic literature, on the issue of participation, seems
to make a distinction between two different stages of the
design and implementation of policy reforms. At the first stage,
the executive authority must be firmly convinced of the
necessity for economic stabilisation and liberalisation, for
without such a commitment, the leadership will be unlikely to
forge ahead with stringent recovery programmes. As the initial
stage usually involves changes in the incentive structure by
altering key relative prices-the exchange rate, producer
prices, interest rates, price decontrols, removal of quantitative
restrictions-these can easily be carried out by a select group
of competent and responsive civil servants. The reforms need
to be embedded in solid technical analysis and can, therefore,
be entrusted to a small group of technocrats.
The problem usually arises when the second stage of

reforms is proposed for implementation-downsizing the civil
service, reducing consumer subsidies. closing down, commer-
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cialising or selling public enterprises, restructuring the
financial sector, exposing industrial firms to competition, etc.
During this phase, broad-based consultation and interaction
with those likely to be affected by these measures can result in
finding alternative and mutually acceptable solutions, and
agreeing on the timing of actions. Listening to the genuine
concerns of those who will be potentially hit by the reforms.
and taking these into account at the time of designing the
programme, will facilitate implementation later on.
But the limitations of this participatory and consultative
approach should also be recognised. The technical nature of
the issues is bound to keep the discussion to a much smaller
audience of educated and well informed groups and
individuals. It is quite likely that the debate and consultations
could end up making concessions to this "participatory" group
at the expense of a much larger segment of the population.
Public policies have been pro-urban in developing countries
historically, with only a few exceptions; subsidies intended for
the poor have been hijacked by the well-to-do and the political
influence of the rentier class has been disproportionately
strong. The urban class, media, large private businesses, trade
unions and academics still favour rapid urbanisation and
industrialisation at all costs as the preferred model for solving
economic problems, although their rhetoric and justification
for this model are couched in terms of helping the poor, the
unemployed and the socially-disadvantaged groups.
In a country with a free and vocal media, and with an
articulate intelligentsia, it would have served well if the
Government had carried out a more intense process of
consultation and communication. and used the feedback
either to modify the elements of the programmes that were
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resented most or to explain the rationale and consequences
candidly. It is not always easy to convince the public at large
about the need to reduce subsidies, but a candid and frank
analysis of the beneficiaries and losers from abolition of
subsidy would have certainly helped.
In case of Pakistan, there is no single constituency
which seems to identify itself with reforms. As discussed
above, the strong elite classes find these reforms
threatening to their immediate interests. The political
leadership considers them as irritants which constrain their
populist instincts to spend money. The media have begun to
play a useful role by raising questions, reporting indiscretions, asking for more information but the standards of
economic journalism leave much to be desired. But what is
really missing is the broad based participation of various
groups and constituencies which are likely to be affected
directly or indirectly by the reforms in the process of
formulation of policies. Until recently, the agreements
negotiated with the IFis were kept secret and the contents
were not disclosed even to the Parliament. The NGOs and
advocacy groups are becoming increasingly involved in
policy discussions in the recent years. The process of
formulation of the environmental law is a good example of
participation of the stakeholders in the policy making. But
this kind of interaction is still not' common and the scene is
still characterised by mutual suspicion and distrust among
the bureaucrats who would like to keep the matters closed
from public scrutiny and the members of the civil society
who start with the presumption that all actions of the civil
servants· and politicians are malafide. There is little doubt
that the open. transparent, participatory methods of policy
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design and implementation do help in generating the desired
results.
Another interesting question that needs to be explored in
the context of ownership is: Is there a tension between
conditionalities of external donors and the country's ownership
of the programme?
First of all, why should the donors use conditionalities to
enforce implementation of reforms by the recipient countries?
The debate on this issue is highly complex, but we will provide
one explanation that has been put forward by Collier (1991).
He thinks that one fundamental change in Africa's external
economic relations since 1960 has been the lack of "agencies
of restraint"-the institutions which protect public assets from
depletion, prevent inflationary money printing, prevent corruption, protect socially productive groups from exploitation, and
enforce consensus. For such agencies to function effectively,
they must be protected from the pressures and strengthened
as to the principles they are designed to uphold. He
hypothesises that because African presidents typically could
not tolerate autonomous centres of power, the donors have
become the new agencies of restraint. These agencies use
"conditionalities" as instruments of restraint.
A different perspective is provided by Herbst ( 1990). who
argues that "There is, in fact. every reason to believe that
without dramatic external pressure, poor economic policies in
African countries will continue". He worries that "should
assorted proposals alleviate the debt burden of even the
poorest countries, there may be a strong temptation on the
part of African leaders to reduce the pace of economic
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reforms". Both these views underpin the donor conditionalities
that have been subject of debate and controversy within and
outside Africa. The literature on the donor conditionalities
specific to the case of Pakistan is relatively thin and therefore
the arguments are drawn largely from the African experience.
There is ample justification for both types of arguments
to apply to Pakistan. The absence of strong domestic agents of
restraint calls for external agents and it is expected that this
external pressure may help bring about good economic
policies. The matter of fact, however,is that external influences
are not only strongly resented but have also not been
particularly successful in turning the policy regime around in
the right direction.
The tension between "ownership" and "conditionalities"
can arise when the recipient country agrees to undertake
actions as part of the conditionalities under the World Bank
loan and/ or the Fund arrangements or donor programmes.
and the loan conditions are either inappropriate to the
economic context of the country or the country has no real
intention of complyingwith those conditions.
Mosley ( 1991), in their study of nine countries receiving
adjustment loans from the World Bank, illustrate this point by
matching the commitment of reforms favoured by the World
Bank with the actual implementation of the loan conditions.
The zero or partial implementation indicates low commitment,
while full implementation indicates high commitment. But
they also find that there are two other cases. First, there are
cases where full implementation of a loan takes place but the
commitment is low. This is the case where all formal
conditions are scrupulously performed but. at the same time
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or shortly afterwards, other actions are taken the effect of
which is to neutralise the result of implementing the original
condition. The other situation arises when loan conditions are
not fulfilled but commitment to reform is high. The authors
hypothesise two causes for this deviation. The first concerns
trivial conditions-other too broad in scope or peripheral-a
matter of detail such as the hiring of consultants, the design of
a minor study, etc. Second, when the required conditions are
infeasible or improbable
If we apply the methodology used by Mosley (1991) to the
case of Pakistan the generalised conclusion one can draw is
that there was only partial implementation of loan conditions
with low degree of domestic ownership and commitment. The
. frequent breakdown of the programmes, incomplete reviews,
large number of waivers granted by the IFis all do confirm this
conclusion.
HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE CAPACITY
FOR IMPLEMENTATION?

Aside from the interest groups and political economic
considerations which we have discussed above, the most
critical missing element in most developing countries is the
implementation capacity not only within the government but,
more broadly, within the civil society. The slow accretion of the
right skill mix, the dilution and depletion of the stock of
already trained and experienced professionals through
migration, and the non and low utilisation of existing capacity
for professional work characterises Pakistan. The excessive
dependence on foreign technical expertise, the donors' own
disposition to employ outside consultants to design the
projects and set up new implementing agencies outside the

Published by iRepository, 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/faculty-research-books/20

24

normal governmental machmery and the penchant of the
political leaders to find "loyalists" rather than the "competent"
among the civil servants to head these donor-assisted projects,
have contributed to the existing state of poor capacity.
Even if there was political commitment and willingness, it
is doubtful if the desired changes can be brought about due to
this capacity constraint. The combination of competent technocracy and reasonably enlightened and popular leadership· is
rare to find in most reforming countries.
As implementation capacity is, by and large, weak in most
developingcountries, the distinction between "capacity saving"
and "capacity using" reforms becomes important. As we have
argued earlier, the first phase of reforms, which alter the
relative prices, liberate the capacity of key government officials
and, hence, are implemented fairly rapidly once consensus is
reached. The other set of reforms that entail more deep-seated
change are highly demanding on the limited administrative
capacity of the government officials, and broad-based participation of other groups can also help the process of
implementation.
We believe that capacity is also endogenous to the
ownership, commitment and a sense of long-term strategic
vision and direction on the part of leaderships. In Korea, when
President Park, who had a clear vision of the direction in which
Korea should move, decided to promote exports, he assembled
a team of the most competent civil servants and entrusted the
task to them. The President personally reviewedand monitored
the situation and allocated rewards and penalties on the basis
of performance in relation to the agreed targets. This mode of
intervention soon had a salutary and positive impact on other
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civil servants, who wanted to demonstrate that they could also
do the job equally well. Capacity building in this case was the
direct result of commitment and ownership by the top political
leadership in the country.
In our view, implementation depends not only on a set of
technocratic measures that can take place by the actsdecrees and orders of civil servants-but also on the capacity
to manage the political support for these measures. The
upfront identification of winners and losers from the various
reforms has to be an integral part of the feasibility of structural
adjustment programmes. There is a diverse array of subgroups
and interests within the government itself that will react
differently to various reforms. For example, public enterprise
managers would oppose reform if it involves closing down or
retrenchment. Ministries charged with revenue collection and
fiscal balances would respond favourably if a reform package
added significantly to available budget resources.
Civil servants might respond negatively to pay scale
reform and cut back in employment levels, but they might be
deterred from opposition if a reform lessened or removed legal
restrictions on their private economic activities. As Haggard
and Kaufman ( 1992) point out "For governments to reduce
their role in the economy and expand the play of market
forces, the state itself must be strengthened". On the one
hand; economic liberalisation entails the curtailment of powers
of the state through privatisation, deregulation, elimination of
central planning and reduction in the work force. The ensuing
uncertainty, lower real wages and lack of job security demotivate the civil servants and, in some cases, lead them to
leave the public service. On the other hand, the tasks of the
government to design, implement and operate myriad com-
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ponents of the structural adjustment programme, maintain
and operate a framework of macroeconomic policies that
provide incentives to the private sector, resolve the structural
problems, and mediate conflicts within the civil society, would
demand scarce technical and administrative skills. If the civil
servants have lost their zeal and motivation, the required
technical and administrative skills will not be available to lead
the implementation of reforms.
The absence of a strong development-oriented visionary
leadership fully committed to economic reforms, and the
dilemma outlined above have worsened the implementation
capacity problem. The process of reforms should be conceived
and presented in the context of long-term development vision.
But in the absence of such a vision, the process is overtaken
by considerations of political and administrative expediency.
Thomas and Grindle (1991) argues that because of the absence
or weakness of pluralist institutions that mediate between
society and the state, the implementation process may be the
major arena in which individuals and groups are able to
pursue conflicting interest and compete for access to scarce.
resources. This conflict finally gets r~solved through the
mechanisms of patronage and opportunities of self enrichment
in which the civil servants play not a restraining but a
facilitating role for the political leaders in power. As Sandbrook
( 1993) shows, the administrative decay in Africa is rooted in
the pervasive clientelistic nature of politics pursued by most
African "presidential-monarchs," who treat the public administration as their personal property. Accordingto Bendix (1992).
these public officials, in patrimonial fashion, then "treat their
administrative work for their leader as a personal service based
on their duty of obedience and respect". Unless fundamental
restructuring and professionalisation of the civil service takes
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place in these countries, the prospects for building implementation capacity will remain bleak despite donors' efforts
and external pressures. The whole structure of governance
needs a thorough re-examination and overhaul.
One of the strong assets in Pakistan had been the
tradition of a merit-based, competent, technocratic public
services structure inherited from the British colonial days.
Until 1973, the insulation of civil servants from political
interference, the security of tenure, and promotions based on
seniority had made the public service an effectivetool of good
governance. The subsequent actions of lateral entry,
nominations based on political loyalty rather than competence,
removal of constitutional guarantee on the security of service,
blatant interference by politicians in the appointments,
transfers, and postings of officers of their choice have
transformed the character of the public service. This has taken
a heavy toll on key economic policy and decision-making
institutions of the country. The Planning Commission along
with the Provincial Planning Departments, the Ministry of
Finance, and the State bank of Pakistan were soon bereft of
professionals in their respective fields. They were .substituted
by amateurs who were loyal to the party in power. The
technocrats who still possessed courage of conviction and
expressed their professional views and opinions without
mincing words were soon sidelined. The message to the rest of
the bureaucracy was loud and clear-either shape up and tow
the party line or ship out as OSDs*. The gradual erosion of a
technocratic group that was really devoted to the reforms and
could manage them competently led to the ascendancy of
external actors, particularly the staff of the IFis. The
*An OSD is an Officer on Special Duty in the Government of Pakistan who
retains his seniority in the respective cadre but is deprived of any specific post or
powers in the system-usually the least desired position.
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ungrudging acceptance of various conditions prescribed by the
!Fis by the new crop of pliant bureaucrats who neither
challenge their assumptions or validity nor show· any skills in
implementing these programmes has resulted in the loss of
credibility for Pakistan.
A comparative study of 17 countries by Nelson (1990) has
concluded that the cases of clear failure all traced collapse in
large part to deeply divided economic teams. In Pakistan, this
indeed has been the case. Most of the time the members of
economic team have been fighting each other and giving mixed
and contradictory signals to the IFis in their negotiations.
Related closely to the loss of a technocratic core group in
government, which is capable of designing an appropriate set
of reforms in a properly phased and sequenced manner, is the
overall capacity of the institutions in the country. In addition
to the macroeconomic management, which resides with the
Ministry of Finance, State Bank, etc., we are concerned with
each sectoral ministry, public corporation and the attached
departments, the provincial and local governments, the judicial
bodies, the parliament and provincial assemblies, the private
sector, the NGOs, and other civilsociety organisations.
There is now a general agreement among virtually all
segments of society that we have suffered terribly as a country
by the decay of these institutions. The selection of wrong
people to top positions, lack of delegated authority, highly
centralised and personalised decision-making, and absence of
accountability for results have weakened the institutional
capabilities. Detailed preparation and cumbersome approval
process combined with fairly lengthy period of implementation
have invariably resulted in cost overruns of the projects and
reduction in the expected benefits.
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Insulating key parts of the bureaucracy from political
pressures has worked well in many East Asian countries but
this can serve the cause of reform if the bureaucrats
are
technically capable-of designing and carrying out the measures
themselves.

A number of empirical studies do suggest that there is
some urgency to put in place measures during the process of
implementation that will neutralise the losers from the reforms
and find ways to cushion them from abrupt and large shocks.
For example, spreading ownership of public enterprises to
workers and the middle class could reduce the opposition to
parastatal reform. Similarly, involving civil servant groups in
civil service reforni could win their support. At the same time,
the potential winners will need to be mobilised to keep up the
pressures for staying on course. Widner ( 1994) argues that, in
· East Asia, liberalising economic reform was a consequence of
more or less explicit "deals" negotiated between leaders,
technocrats and the heads of the networks or groups that
structure political life. These compromises insulated policy
making in the short- and medium-term. But in the multi-

ethnic and fragmented politics of Africa, striking
compromises has proved more arduous.

such

While neutralising the losers from the reforms is in
practice problematic, building coalitions of winners from the
reforms is even more difficult. The problem is particularly
severe when, for example, as in the case with trade reform, the
gainers (e.g. consumers) are many, but each gains a small
amount, while the lo~ers (e.g. textile workers) are few, but each
loses a large amount. In most other cases of reforms, typically·
the costs are in the present and very certain, but the benefits
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are. in the future and uncertain. This makes the task of
building coalitions of winners arduous.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS

FOR THE FUTURE
Pakistan has not been a successful example of
implementing structural reforms although the country has
entered formal programmes of adjustment with the !Fis on five
or six different occasions in the past decade and more than a
dozen times since 1980. This paper has demonstrated that the
two variables generally correlated with success, i.e., domestic
ownership and capacity, were found absent in this case. To
recapitulate:
(a) The main motivation underlying these programmes was
not longer term transformation of the economic
structure but short term Injection of liquidity to avert
foreign exchange shortages and replenish reserves.
Adjustment was thus taken as a purely short term
palliative measure to buy time rather than an
opportunity to introduce much desired policy and
institutional changes.
(b) The vested interest groups which were likely to lose out
from these reforms, if they were implemented seriously,
had strong political and economic hold on the decisionmaking process under every elected government. They
were therefore instrumental in ensuring that only some
cosmetic changes were made to obtain foreign funding
and then go ahead with business as usual.
(c) The leadership in Pakistan during the last decade
remained preoccupied mainly with the challenges of
retaining power in the face of a vigilant military
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oversight, building political coalitions and alliances and
thus sticking to the lowest common denominator
acceptable. It is only after the 1997 election that
Pakistan has witnessed a government enjoying clear
cut majority and the demise of the troika consisting of
the President, Prime Minister and the Army Chief of
Staff which held the real power.
(d) The reform packages have never had a broad ownership
even within the Government apparatus. These were
designed mainly by the IFis. and negotiated by a narrow
technocratic group drawn from the Ministry of Finance
and the State Bank with the blessing of the Prime
Minister in office. At no occasion, except for the most
recent agreement. the contents of the agreement were
discussed with the Parliament or disclosed to the
general public.
(e) Finally, the quality of human capital and the resiliency
of institutions-the two essential ingredients required
for domestic capacity to implement these reform
packages-has badly eroded over time. Leaving aside
the narrow, small technocratic group at the centre, the
ministries, corporations, autonomous bodies and the
provincial governments charged with implementation of
the reforms lacked the requisite capabilities, autonomy
and accountability.
What are the broad lessons learnt from this experience for
the future management and political economy of reforms?
(a) The design of the programmes should usually follow
two phases. In the initial phase when changes are
sought in the incentive structure by altering relative
prices such as exchange rates, interest rates, tariffs
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and taxes, producer prices, public utility prices, etc. a
team of competent technocrats insulated from political
pressures can . be more effective in introducing and
implementing these changes. At the second stage,
when far reaching changes are the objective such as
privatisation of public enterprises, downsizing of civil
service, restructuring of key institutions, de-protection
of manufacturing sectors, etc., widespread consultations and discussions with affected groups and
economic actors are helpful in clarifying issues and
building consensus.
(b) The political commitment to the programme will be
strengthened if the economic reforms generate recovery
and supply response in the earlier years of the
programme. thus mobilisingthe potential beneficiaries;
otherwise a sense of fatigue and cynicism creeps in to
erode the commitment. Foreign inflows in the right
amount and right time help reinforce the commitment.
but the positive results early on are the only solid basis
on which further reforms can be built upon. In a
sequenced approach to the reforms the more difficult
reforms can withstand resistance only if the earlier
reforms had shown some positive results. Open
communications and education of the population at
every stage of implementation are the sine qua non for
the success of the programme. Early sensitisation and
involvement of the parliamentary groups in the design
and supervision of the programme may prove helpful.
The challenge is how to convert the widespread
populist sentiment of the elected leaders to a more
prudent management of scarce economic resources for
the larger benefit of the society rather than themselves
or their allies.
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k) The

general finding from the successful examples of
adjustment is that the urban bias of the past was
largely reversed as the population in the rural areas
benefited substantially. while key · urban groups
shouldered a large share of the cost. However, new
coalitions of beneficiaries were not created which could
support the reform programmes. As a consequence,
powerful urban groups-trade unions, middle class
professionals, and students-unions form the main
opposition to certain reform policies and programmes.
It is important to neutralise the losers from reforms,
who are likely to be adversely affected by the
liberalisation and ensuing competition. It is not enough
to either ignore them lightly as vested interests or
repress them. They are important potential contributors to development process and also have a
tremendous influence in organising and mobilising
public opinion. Those who are truly committed to their
professions will either withdraw from the scene and
emigrate thus depriving the country of valuable skills.
Although this challenge of neutralising the losers is
daunting, the involvement of NGOs, professional associations, opinion makers and other interest groups,
and consultations with these groups in the design and
implementation of policies affecting them, will be
helpful in understanding their view points and
concerns and arriving at mutually acceptable solutions.
The current practice of "secrecy" and inadequate communication and consultation accentuates the feeling of
mistrust and suspicion.
{d) Once the reform package has been designed after broad
consultations and consensus building the government
should persevere with it even iri the face of adversity
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and hostile opposition. This will maintain the
credibility of the programme and enhance the chances
of its successful completion. Where the executive
authority is fully behind the programme, on the basis
of its own internal conviction rather than external
pressure, it does make sure that the execution and
implementation do take place with due diligenceand at
the requisite speed to achieve results within the given
time frame. The leadership assigns this task to the
most competent individuals and most efficient groups
and institutions, then monitors the progress and
results from time to time and rewards and punishes
the individuals concerned on the basis of performance.
(e) Flexibilityand agility in responding to exogenous and
unanticipated shocks and surprises-either external or
domestic-differentiate those who have succeeded in
keeping the reform process on course from those who
failed to stop the derailment. The response from the
IFis and donors should be equally prompt and·
adequate. The performance criteria negotiated
originally should be modified and contingency financing mechanisms triggered off immediately without
waiting to determine whether the shocks are transitory
or permanent in nature. The protracted discussion· on
the question as to whether or not the response to these
should be through further adjustment or additional
financing can potentially disrupt the reform process.
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ABSTRACT
The wholesale views of the relative success or failure of
adjustment policies or its causes are challenged by a number
of empirical studies. These studies demonstrate that there is
considerable variation in the economic results of adjustment
programmes, and this variation is explicable in terms of the
context. quality, and sustained application of adjustment
policies. This lecture focuses on the political economy aspects
of the sustainability of economic reforms by introducing three
basic hypotheses, and testing them with the Pakistani
evidence. According to these hypotheses, variation in the
result of economic policy reforms depends on: (i) a set of initial
conditions which precipitate the decision to · undertake
adjustment
programmes; (ii) the country's sense of
"ownership" of the reform process as indicated by the
consensus among the social and political organisations and
the presence of a technocratic care group in government
devoted to reforms; and (iii) the presence of "capacity" in the
country in terms of human capital and resilience of
institutions.
In the case of Pakistan, the main motivation for entering
into adjustment programmes has been the short term foreign
liquidity infusion by international financial institutions and
other donors. The ownership of reforms has been narrow and
domestic capacity to implement them has eroded over time.
Several lessons for future management of the reforms can be
drawn from this analysis.
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